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Summary
;
Economic theory predicts that market forces under conditions of uncertainty
will work to equalize risk-adjusted rates of return across all activities by
directing additional Investment towards those activities with excess returns per
unit of risk and away fron those with lower returns per unit of risk borne. This
adjustment process, hov;ever, appears to have operated only very weakly, if at all,
in mid-nineteenth century manufacturing. Excess returns persisted over time and
across industries and failed to attract the needed additional investment in any
systematic manner. This market failure was apparently most complete in the South
and may account for the slov/er pace of industrialization in America ; and the
relatively backward position of the South.
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RISK, THE RATE OF RETURl-I AND TITE PATTERN OF IMVESTMEl'TT
IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AlERICAN I>roUSTRIALIZATION*
Long-run equilibrium under conditions of atomistic competition,
requires that all firms earn only normal profit. This condition
comes about because excess profits attract additional investment •
while below normal profits lead to the reallocation of resources to -
bther, more profitable, activities. In the former case, existing
"firms expand and new ones enter the more remunerative industry, in-
creasing the supply of the product and, ceteris paribus , driving • -^
down price to equality with the minimum long-run average cost. In
increasing cost indusuries, the adjustment process is hastened by
rising costs due to the upward pressure on factor prices. There are
~
'effciimstances, such aS a pure monopoly with effective barriers to
sentry, in which a different theoretical result prevails, but these ;
are viewed ks exceptions. In reality, the many conditions subsumed-;
under the ceteris paribus assumption do not hold long enough for ••;• r,
equilibrium to be reached, but even so the expectation is that there
would be a tendency towards equilibrium signalled by a flow of re-
•
sources towards the industry v;ith the super-normal profits. •;; : -
This basic theory has prevailed from at least the time, of tb©:;
T'fealth of Nations and underlies much empirical work such as that of
Bain, his followers and his critics. Bain's entry inducing price,: for
example, (Bain, 1956) is the analog of profit induced investment. More-
bVer, these basic premises are at the heart of empirical work oft in-
vestment behavior. Much of this work (Jorgensen, 1971; Kuh, 1963;
Meyer and Kiih, 1957) has, however, rejected the profit adjustmeHt.
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hypothesis as a major determinant in investment decisions. These
tfists, however, cannot reject the classical hypothesis which states
only that excess profits indicate where additional investment should
go and should, eventually, induce sufficient new investment to eli-
minate the excess. Those empirical tests have been concerned with
the volume of investment, and not simply its direction or efficacy in
eliminating excess profits. The volume, of course, depends on a num-
ber of things, such as the physical production relationships for the
firm, the price elasticity and growth of demand, technological change
and on investor expectations. Further, the theory of investment is
chiefly concerned with the explanation of capital accumulation along
an equilibrium growth path, where profit differentials should theoret-
ically be non-existent. Empirically, profit differentials did exist,
but often the industries and firms under study were not far from the
norm of profits. Overall, therefore it is not surprising that the
profit thesis has not fared well. Hence it is of some interest that
the one detailed study of nineteenth century investment found that
profits were a significant explanatory variable in accounting for
invesOiient in the New England textile industry. (IIcGouldrick, 1968),
The major empirical studies of investment to date have not taken
risk into account when formulating their profit tests. Differences
in profits across firms and industries have been treated as being
equally riskless, assuming, implicitly, that all above average profits
are excessive and equally attractive to the investor with normal •
-
preferences. Very few studies have examined the economy's response
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to profit differentials after allowance has been made for the greater
risks inherent in some activities, and none of the major studies
of investment (e.g. Eisner (1964); Hickman (1965); Kuh (1963); Meyer
and Kuh (1957)) allowed for risk, largely, it appears, because they
treat profits as influencing investment through the supply of funds,
not simply as an incentive. Stlgler (1963) did examine the re-
lationship between risk and profit, but found it unimportant.
However, he did not consider risk when testing the relationship
between profit and investment. T^^)'o recent studies have tried to
determine the extent to which risk explains persistently high rates
of return in some industries. Joy and Litzenberger (1973) found
that the rates of return in certain industries were higher than could
be justified by the greater risk exposure, and that they persisted at
that level. In their view, the inadequate investment response reflected
the effect of barriers to entry. More recently, Bothvjell and Keeler
(1976) have considered the effects of market structure and risk on
rates of return. Using their more precise measure of the impact of
portfolio risk on return, they found that the risk variable did have
the correct sign and was significant, but so too were the market
structure variables. Both risk and market power served to raise
returns. Their conclusion that "correctly adjusting profits for
risk does not alter the basic relationship between market structure
and market performance," corroborates the view of Joy and Litzenberger,
The rate of profit earned by manufacturers during the period
1350 through 1870 appears to have been quite high (Bateman, Foust
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and 'Jeiss, 1975; Bateraan and Weiss, 1976 and 1977). The most re-
cent estimates for a number of industries for the nation as a whole
2
are give in Table 1. Rates of return clearly varied among
industries and over time. Tliey also varied between areas, although
the latter are not shown here. In this paper we propose to examine
the economy's response to these profit differentials in about 60
industries at the national level and a somewhat smaller number at
the regional level.
Our standard economic theory has traditionally ignored the ele-
ment of risk, prefering to deal instead with a world of certainty.
Risk, however, was certainly present in nineteenth century manufac-
turing and neither the would-be impartial investor nor the manufac-
turer could have been ignorant of it. I^Iarket forces, to the extent
that they worked in the manner traditionally assumed, and to the
extent that they recognized and measured risk, should work to equalize
the risk-adjusted rates of return, rather than the nominal ones. The
risk came from many sources, such as uncertain machine or labor per-
formance, entrepreneurial failure and market uncertainties. More-
over, some risk was industry specific, v^7hile other risks were more
general. To the extent that our data represent random samples of
firms, we assume that the variability of industry rates of return
about their means reflect the degrees of risk in those industries.
Risk averse investors would only be willing to assume greater risks
if rewarded by higher returns. That is, given Wo choices A and 3
which offer the same expected rate of return, the risk averse in-
vestor would prefer the one with lower variability. The degree of
-5-
TABLE 1
RATE OF PROFIT IN MAIIUFACTURING IN THE UNITED STATES
1850-1870 BY iiAJOR MDUSTRIES
INDUSTRY M
1850
u
1860
P
1370
o
Agricultural Implements .230 .436 .213 .421 .124 .395
Blacksmi thing .395 .737 .302 .499 .552 .490
Books and Shoes .318 .514 .341 .508 .620 .648
Brick Making .008. .540 .135 .723 .206 .724
Clothing .129 .352 .211 .363 .270 .369
Cooperage .142 .478 .191 .469 .218 .438
mour Milling -. ;- ;'.., .221 .526 .233 .4 22 .193 ,841
Furniture .251 .436 .211 .415 .310 .373
Iron, Bar .008 .308 .210 .253 .051 .219
Iron, Cast .218 .291 .242 .386 .180 .335
Iron» Pig .220 .559 .092 .304 -.016 ai8
Leather .227 .402 .234 .522 ,213 .365
Lumber Milling
.
.224 .392 .233 .402^ .173 .434
Machinery .f68 ,361. .310 .430 .185 .274
Meat Packing .290 .546 .427 .586 .631 .510
Printing .331 .396 .313 .403 .322 .378
Saddlery,- . . .335 .591 .397 .672 .385 .588
Textiles, Cotton .002 .160 .136 .205 .185 .303
Textiles, Woolen .100 .233 . .206 .388 .140 .281
Tin, Copper and Sheet Iron .354 .493 .228 .392 .284 .382
Wagons and Carriages .216 .354 .238 .358 .257 .360
All Industries .261 .529 .259 . .475 .293 .568
Source: Computed from the Bateman-Weiss Manuscript Census Samples.
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risk aversion depends upon the shape of the individual's utility fun-
ction and, hence, the extent to which rates of return have to he
adjusted so that an individual would be indifferent between two op-
portunities bearing different risks varies from person to person.
One way to assess the importance of risk is to try to measure
how much of a given rate of return represents a premium for bearing
risk and how much represents a "riskless" rate of return. This may
be done by estimating the simple OLS equation:
E(R) = R_ + b-a
where E(R) is the mean rate of return in an industry and a is the stan-
dard deviation of individual firm rates of return about the mean '
(Stigler, 1963; Fisher and Hall, -1969; Cootner and Holland, 1979).
This equation defines what has been called the Capital Market Line
in the theory of Finance (Sharpe, 1964). The coefficient of o indicates
the importance of the risk premium and represents the increase in
the mean rate of return necessary to compensate the investor for a unit
increase in the risk. The constant terra in the equation, R^, represents
3
the "riskless" rate of return.
Table 2 presents the regional and national estimates of this
equation for the three census years, 1350, 1360 and 1370, The re-
4
suits provide very strong support for the notion of risk aversion.
Investors demanded and received quite hir;h risk premiums for bearing
additional risk. In 1850, the risk premium was highest in the West,
somewhat lower in the South and lowest in the North. To the extent
that investor-appraisals of risk are in part conditioned by experience
-7-
TABLE 2
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RISK AND THE RATE OF RETURN IN IIAlviUFACURING
INDUSTRY BY REGION, 1850-1870^
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
ITOIBER OF R^YEAR/REGION
,
CONSTAI^T b
(=Riskless Rate of Return) (=Risk Premium) IlvIDUSTRIES
1850
North -.040
(.057)
.620**
(.162)
47 .228
South
West
U.S.
-.092
(.074)
t
-.170'
(.080)
t
(.041)
.872**
(.155)
,992**
(.140)
.803**
(.086)
43
42
66
.421
.546
.570
1860
North .022
(.041)
.593**
(.106)
53 .367
South +-.153
(.056)
1,108**
(.115)
38 .715
West -.013
(.056)
.568**
(.110)
41 39';
U.S. .068
(.039)
.472**
(.090)
66 .288
1870
North .086
(.04 9)
.554**
(.126)
38 .330
South .005
(.048)
.714**
(.071)
34 .752
West .059
(.082)
.54 6**
(.188)
39 .164
U.S. .097
(.052)
.401**
(.110)
57 .181
Table 2 Continued,
The estimating equation was E(R) = R^ + ba, where E(R) is the mean
industry rate of return and o is the standard deviation of that
return. All estimates are OLS.
Regions as follows?
North: CT, DE, DC, ME, MD, ilA, M, NJ, NY, PA, VT
South: AL, AR., FL, KY, iiS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA, IfV
West: CA, XL, IN, lA, 'kS, -ill, I-flN, HO, OH^ -OR, WI
Significantly greater, than zero at the one percent level.
Significantly different from zero at the five percent level.
V,-
(i.e. adaptive expectations), this pattern is consistent with the
pattern of regional manufacturing deve.lopnent . By IS6O5 the risk
preniuras fell in both the ''lorth and '^est and fell a,o;ain between 1560
and 1870 which xj'ould be consistent virith the accimulation of knowledr^e
and experience and the flow of investment between the Atlantic and.
Wew England states and the mid-'^est. Indeed by 1860 the risk pre-
mium in the 'Jest was virtually identical with that demanded by inves-
tors in the north-eastern states.
''Jhile the risk premium demanded in the South also fell between 1860
and 1870 J the trend bet\i7een 1"50 and 1360 runs opposite to that in the
other rec>ions. T^efore the Civil Warj the southern investor apparently
became much more risk averse so that in 1860 the southern investor
demanded almost double the incremental return per unit of risk re-
quired by other investors. Although, the risk premium fell between
1860 and 1870, the risk premium ox the southern investor in 1870
was still 30 percent above that of the typical northern or west-
ern investor. This behavior is consistent with the "safety-first"
behavior of the southern agriculturalists at this tim-e who preferred
a more diversified, and hence, less risky, mix of agricultural crops
before the Civil War (VJri'^ht and Kunreuther, 1975).
The differential levels of risk aversion across regions and
over time suggest that investor responses to a market investment
stimulus were also likely to have varied. The traditional viev; has
been that in the Northeast and Midwest the response Vi7as generally in
the right direction while in the South it called forth a totally in-
appropriate response; inadequate not only in size but even in direc-
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tion. Thus, for example, the southern planter continued to invest
in more land, more slaves and more cotton despite the publicity ac-
corded manufacturin.'^ by champions of industrialism such as ^lilliam
Gregg or James Hammond and by newspaper and magazine accounts of
successful enterprises and the various Commercial Conventions (liitchell,
1928; Wender, 1930; Genovese, 1965; Lander, 1969). Even more recent
work has suggested that the competitive predictions of a flow of in-
vestment into those fields with the highest excess return per unit
of risk were not fully met during this period in terms or equalizing
risk-adjusted returns (Bateman and Weiss, 1976 and 1977). Me propose
to examine this further in the light of more complete data.
Excess return per unit of risk is defined as:
.,. . E(R) - R.
.
. ,.
•• J L ...•.•> rri:--^- •
''e(r)
.
.•':• :
. J •. ::-.::-.
where E(R)
. is the mean rate of return in industry j,
R-r is the riskless rate of return, ,,,,...
and Op/T,\ is the standard deviation of the industry mean rate of re-
turn. - r • r
-In modern studies of capital markets, the "riskless" rate of . return
is usually thought of as the rate of return on short-dated Treasury
bonds, while in the nineteenth centxiry, the numeraire most frequently
used by modern researchers has been the rate of return on railroad bonds,
namely 6 percent. It is doubtful, however, whether the 1850 investor
would have felt very secure with any then existing interest paying
asset. The 1840s had witnessed, for example, .default on state bonds
and drastic declines in the prices of railroad stocks (Taylor, 1951).
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Indeed, our estimates of the "riskless" rate of return in 1350 were
not significantly different from zero in the North and South (which
had the most developed capital markets and lowest risk aversion) and
were significantly less than zero in the West and for the nation as
a whole in 1850. That iSj in the Uest and in the United States, the
1850 investor in manufacturinp, was willing to pay for certainty. Thus,
for example, the investor in the West in 1850 was willing to pay 17
cents for the privilege of receiving a dollar with certainty a year
hence. The "riskless" rate of return rose slightly in 1860 and 1870
to 6.8 percent in 1860 and 9.7 percent by 1870 for the nation, however,
it was never significantly greater than zero and the western rate was
below the eastern rate. In the South in 1860, the "riskless" rate of
return was estimated to be significantly negative reinforcing the
risk-averse, "safety-first" behavior which we have already mentioned.
The "appropriate" value for R, is therefore not self-evident.
One approach would be to use the estimates in Table 2 of the risk-
less rate of return in each region and year but those estimates are
based upon a portfolio containing only investment opportunities in man-
ufacturing. The traditional, approach has been to specify some market
return as a proxy for the riskless rate. VJhile this rate may be some-
what appropriate for New England and the Middle Atlantic states in 1860
it is doubtful whether it is a good estimate in other years and for
other regions. We have nevertheless used such estimates of R but have
compromised by not using a straight 6 percent.
Risk-adjusted profitability assumes that the investor can bor-
row and lend at the "riskless" rate. However, the entrepreneur- investor
-Il-
ls unable to engage in any further investment diversification. That
is, he can choose only investment combinations involving a single,
risky manufacturing enterprise and lending or borrowing at the risk-
less rate. He cannot try to maximize his expected return by investing
in several different risky ventures. Today, with the sophisticated in-
vestment analysis, the rise of corporate ownership and the complex and
smooth working capital markets available, such an assumption is unrea-
sonable. For the mid-ninei;eenth century investor this is not the case.
The typical, industrialist of this era invested in a single firm, one
which could be supervised personally. The major investment decisions
were constrained by the inability to divide one's entrepreneurial
talent.. Our assumption, then, does not grossly misrepresent the
situation of that time.
The first test applied to the risk-adjusted data was to deter-
mine whether the persistence of high profits was due to chance or
whether it was systematically related to industrial classification
and time. The null hypothesis in each case was that the excess re-
, turns per unit of risk were due solely to chance against the alter-
i. native hypothesis that there was some non-random pattern to the high
•' return which persisted across industries or across time. The form
>, of the test was a fixed effects, completely randomized, 2-way ana-
.
lysis of variance with one observation per cell which is the same
:• as the fixed effects, randomized block, one-way ANOVA model except
for its interpretation (Yamane, 1973) . The results are summarized
in Table 3. As can be seen, the null hypothesis, that persistently
-12-
TAxjLL 3
PKx.SlSTEi:CL UF liXCliSS .LLTURiiS PE.; .IISK UiilT
lwiJ-lu7U
(Sui.a.iary of l-\iay Ai.OVA ii.oJel, fixeu effects > one observation per cell )
Source of Variation V.-Val ues
i.:or th South I.est U.S.
Industry
Time
l.S2Gv^-
(31, G4)
2.723+
(2,93)
.939
(27,56)
4.132-"-
(2.U1)
1.0G4
(32, G6)
1 7. G4 9 •'•"
(2,9G)
1.G91-"-
(5J,102)
1G.94G^'---;.-
(2,15u)
Figures in parentheses are ae^^rees of freedoii
^See Yaniane (1973).
t Significant at the ID'/, level.
•it
Significant at the 5Z level.
Significant at the 1% level.
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high excess returns per unit of risk were due to chance, is rejec-
ted in five of the cases considered. In the South, West and
for the nation, chance is rejected because the time effect is sig-
nificant. Indeed, at the ten percent level of significance, the null
.hypothesis is rejected in each case because of the persistance of
.excess returns per unit of risk over time. In two instanqes, the
North and the U.S., the industry effect also proved significant. As
the North was the most heavily industrialized region and often charac-
terized as the most market oriented, this former result is particu-
larly noteworthy and the significance at the national level probably
reflect the dominance of manufacturing in the' North.
In all regions, but particularly in the West, these results
point to substantial time lags in the adjustment to profit differen-
tials. Moreover, investors in the North were also apparently reluc-
tant to take advantage of profit differentials between industries.
In short, this test indicates that the market system failed in its
task of equalizing risk adjusted rates of return and this market
failure was more general rather than specific to a particular region
(i.e. the South) as often assumed.
The failure of the market to eliminate profit differentials does
not necessarily imply that the market had ceased working to reduce
or eliminate them. In reality, adjustments are not instantaneous.
There are lags and delays in all stages of the process from the
perception of these differentials, to the spread of knowledge about
them and investor response to them. Equilibrium conditions, too,
posit that other things have not changed. Yet, in this tumultuous
-14-
period of industrialization other things were continually changing.
Thus, we need to determine whether the investment response, which
was clearly inadequate to the task of substantially reducing profit
differences (much less equalizing them), might have been correct to
some degree. We have attempted to do this in several quite simple
ways, performing tests that are much less complex than the equations
and models used in recent studies of investment demands. This greater
simplicity reflects the nature of the data available to us rather
than a conscious decision that the more sophisticated approach is
inappropriate.
Given the nature of these data, our formulation of the test was
severely restricted. For one thing, the lack of data on capacity,
utilization rates and annual sales precluded consideration of any
accelerator effects. In our view this was not a severe handicap. Our
purpose was not to predict precisely the pattern and timing of invest-
ment demand, but rather to test the proposition that investment re-
sponded to excess profits. Simple corielations between profit and
investment have proven positive in some studies of the twentieth
century (Ileyer and Kuh (1957); Eisner (I960)) even though more com-
plex models have predicted investment better and have minimized the
role of profits as an explanatory variable (Eisner, (1960) Kuh, (1971))
Further, most studies show that profits are correlated with these
other variables (viz. sales or sales/capacity) which better explain
investment demand. Thus, the exclusion of these other variables
served to increase the expectations of a positive relation between
profits and investment.
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Our reliance on bencl-unark data on profits and decadal changes "
in capital poses a different problem, but again one which does not
seem intolerable. These data may not reflect accurately the behavior
of the profit and investment variables during intervals between cen-
sus dates, but this is not really necessary. Studies of investment
stress the time lags involved in the process, with lags of up to two
or three years having been used successfully. Bain (1956) argues
for the use of a five to ten year period to represent the long' run
adjustment to equilibrium. In earlier times the lags were almost
certainly this long. On the profit side, the question is twofold,
does the point estimate of profit reflect the profit experience of
subsequent years, and does it reflect investors' expectations about
profits. ,'..: J'\ ' ' . .'/
"v
'
,''',!' ,,,•'• '.\,' • •
• We have performed three tests designed to measure whether or
not market forces were working according to competitive predictions,
despite their failure to eliminate the excess returns per unit of
risk across time and industries. These tests vary in their statis-
tical power and in the strength of their fundamental assumptions.
For each, the null hypothesis of the competitive prediction is that
an excess rate of return par unit of risk led to additional investment
in that activity, while a low return per unit of risk, di^douraged
investment.
However, these te&ts also require judgment as to whether or not
the observed increase in the capital stock was consistent with t'he
equilibrating adjustment process. This depends upon a variety of
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factors about vi/hich we have very limited information. But on the
production side we do have evidence indicating tliat almost all manu-
facturing industries were operating in the range of constant returns
to scale, so that whatever increases in output were necessary to make
price equal to average cost would have given rise to proportionate
increases in capital (Atack, 1976). Similarly, increases in demand
would also be accompanied by proportionate increases in capital.
What remains then is whether some industries experienced a more rapid
rate of technical change and/or more rapid growth of demand over the
subsequent decade. The former, if neutral in nature, would mean a
less than proportionate increase in capital for each increase in
demand. The latter would mean above average increases in capital.
We know little about the pace of technical progress in a quan-
titative sense and less about its differential advance across in-
dustries during the nineteenth century. The estimates of Gallman
(1960) suggest that in the aggregate the pace of technological change
was not of great importance in accounting statistically for the growth
of output during the nineteenth century and others agree with this
at least until the 1370' s (Davis, 1971). Estimates of industrial
production functions wliere a technological change variable is included,
are consistent with these historical claims. Of the twenty-three
industries for which such functions were fitted, the coefficient of
p
technological change is significantly positive in only eight cases.
Of these eight, only two (boots and shoes, and saddlery) are indus-
tries of major importance. Of course, in some industries the tech-
nical change which did occur has been seen as labor-saving, so its
-17-
impact on the growth of capital could influence sorae industries more
than others (Uselding and Juba, 1973).
On the demand side we know only that, in general, one would ex-
pect manufacturing to experience greater increases than farm products
during this period because of its greater income elasticity of de-
mand. However, we do not know how large the difference would be.
For 1875, Williamson (1967) found that manufactured products, such
as clothing, dry goods and sundries had higher expenditure elastici-
ties than did food items. Since food products are also uianufac tured
items and non-food items create a demand for farm products such as
cotton and wool, the differences in the growth of demand between
agricultural and manufactured goods may not liave been very great.
But in the aggregate, the evidence on value-added shows that manu-
facturing grew by 338 per cent between 1849 and 1879, somewhat faster
than the 213 per cent figure achieved by agriculture (Gallman, 1960).
In constant prices, the percentage increases were 302 and 162 per
cent. Of course, within the manufacturing sector the differences
in income elasticity of demand could have produced substantially dif-
ferent rates of growth of demand. This should not influence our sign
test of the relationship between profit and investment, but could
distort the other tests where greater precision would be necessary
to obtain unambiguous results and may explain some of the results
reported below.
The strongest test we have used, both in terms of its assumptions
and its potential results, is a simple linear regression asserting that
the level of excess returns in the base year determined the percentage
-18-
increase in investment in the industry during the course of the ensuing
decade. The results, as shown in Table 4, offer uo support for such a
strong hypothesis. Excess returns ptr unit of risk explain virtually
none (less than ten percent, at least) of the variability in the changes
in the level of investment by industry. In no case is the regression
coefficient of excess returns significantly different from zero, let
alone greater than zero as implicit in our formulation of the test.
Indeed in a number of instances the coefficient had a negative sign
attached to it though no weight was given such results.
The failure of the data to pass the test of market responsiveness
led to our applying a weaker test, namely a rank correlation test. Once
again our null hypothesis that markets worked in the manner described
by our economic theory required merely that higher excess returns be
associated with greater percentage increases in investment during the
following decade. Tliis hypothesis was rejected in every case at the
5 percent level. The results are shown in Table 5.
A variety of explanations for the failure of the data to pass our
simple market tests are possible. The most controversial is, of course,
that markets did not work, thereby assuming that our tests are appro-
priate and our data accurate. l\lhile we believe that our data accurately
measure the levels and variabilities of profitability during the census
years we are less willing to defend strongly our claim that the measured
profitability can serve as a proxy for investor expectations during the
following decade or for a period equal to a decade minus the gestation
period of the investment although we do not consider that claim to be
implausible. We have therefore formulated a third test which is biased
-1.-
iixijljU H
oL5> i.stii-.ates of tae ..elationsiiip uetx/een the Increase m
InUustry lavest.ient Ovei: the course of a Jecacie and the
Excess ^.eturn Fer Dnit of I'.isl; in Tnat Industry
in tiie ijase Periou, lo5J-l>-i7J
^epenaent Variable Coefficient of the Lxcess ..eturn Fer Unit of
.;.is.: in:
U.S. l-torth South '.'est
Percsnta^e Increase
in Investment between;
lu50-6a
1jCU-70
Io70-a0
-.252 .064 .02u .447
(.637) (.465)' (.4oG) (.595)
-.271 .00^ .343 1.373
(.1%) (.2o^) (.413) (.7GU)
.04G .lo4 -.305 .lo6
(.17C) (.202) (.23u) (.232)
Standard errors i:re given in parentheses.
iAuL^ J
[jpearman's i^ank Correlation Coefficients ±>et\jeen the Level
of Lxcess r.eturns and the Increase in InvestMent
Cver the following DecaJe
ilankin;^ of lixcess i.eturns A;3ainst
the Increase in Investment in: U.S. . orta Louta -.'est
1J50-60 .071 .OJw -.091 -.OlS
(.31o) (.4^1) (.3J2) (.45^.)
1^6U-70 . -.231 -.113 .053 .133
(.052) (.254) (.3S6) (.232)
lw70-oU .032 .113 -.323 .1.J3
(.417) (.2o4) (.054) (.162)
SiQ,nificance levels are [^iven in parentheses.
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in favor of accepting the null hypothesis that markets did indeed work
and which draws heavily upon the theory of finance.
Specifically, that theory describes a locus of efficient portfolios,
showing the various combinations of return and risk that are equal in
terms of their risk-adjusted value. The estimated locus can also repre-
sent, ceteris paribus , the equilibrium value toward which individual
opportunities will converge. In a world where investors can engage in
unlimited diversification the construction of this locus oecomes complex
and involves the covariation between individual returns and the market
average return. However,- where diversification, other than "risk-free"
lending, is either not possible or not practiced, the estimation of the
locus is more direct involving only a linear relation between two points.
One of these points is the risk-free, market rate of interest, (point
R in diagram 1) the other is the combination of return-risk available
in some risky endeavor. For an individual investor, that latter point
would be the alternative with the highest return per unit of risk, but
to determine the norm we need some risky alternative that yields a value
reflecting long term equilibrium. We could choose the mean for all
manufacturing (point A in Figure 1) and then classify all industries
with risk-return combinations above line RIl as earning excess profits.
Alternatively, we could have chosen a more conservative measure, namely
the risk-return combination for farming (point C in Figure 1) and con-
sidered industries with combinations above RF as earning excess profits.
In fact we have used both of these measures in our test. In those
industries with excess profits (those with risk-return combinations
above RM) the norm of capital growth has been taken to be that of farm
fmmt
ZiA''^1.'XV.?JASQECtlC:^', U'.'lliS^ '•UJSS.'.'iXSSm^OX.'na^'Z.'^TjAVfJl^-rrz----3C7r--?5a>
STANDARD DtVIATION
OF RAT£ OF RETURN
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capital, which, because its return was below that for all manufacturing,
should be relatively slow growing. For industries earning belovj average
risk-return combinations, those lying below RF, which itself lies below
the average manufacturing return, the norm of capital growth is that of
Q
manufacturing capital. Those earning excess profits according to this
definition should exhibit subsequent capital increases more rapid than
the less attractive farm sector. Those earning low risk adjusted rates
of return should exhibit capital increases slower than that which pre-
vailed in the more rapidly growing manufacturing sector.' Thus'we are
neglecting some industries whose returns are too close to the norm, and
simultaneously selecting investment norms that should be biased in favor
of the hypothesis.
A pattern consistent with the null hypothesis occurred if (a) an
industry with a net return per unit of risk in excess of the mean for
all manufacturing in the region experienced a larger percentage increase
in its capital stock than for farming in the region, or (b) an industry
with a net return per unit of risk below that for agriculture in the
region experienced a increase in its capital stock below that for all
manufacturing in the region. The resultant statistic follows the
binomial distribution and permitted us to test whether the percentage
of industries passing the test was greater than could be expected by
chance alone. The results, as shown in Table 6, are that the markets
were functioning, albeit weakly (despite the bias of the test in this
direction) and that, with the exception of the South, the significance
of this relationship increased over time. Thus, except for the South,
the market of the 1870s worked better than the market of the 1850s in
-24-
'i/..LLL G
ilelative Frequencies of Industries Passing the "Si^n"
Test by Ke^^ions an^i Years
L.e^ion
Test Jroup U.S. i.ortli Soutu \/est
luiiJ iixcess Profits \'ith
1J50-6U luvestiuent .04 .64 .34 .33
IJ&U lixcess Profits "itu
TdCO-lO lavestuient .G'J'-'- '.73" .6J .75"
lo7U iiJicess Profits V7ita
lu70-^0 InvestL.ent .73-'- .7y-'- .62 .77-'-
"Si^^nificantly greater than expected (.50) at better than the five
percent level.
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terms of allocating investmenc funds to those areas \>n.th excess returns
per unit of risk. In the South, market failure appears to have been
much uore complete. The reasons for this failure are, however, another
story (Bateman and Weiss, 1979).
Although our conclusion is not likely to be a popular one, particu-
larly amongst those of the "Chicago School," it is that market forces
in the mid-nineteenth century were slow to act and weak when they did
so. To anyone familiar with Davis' trark on nineteenth century markets
this should not be an entirely n^vel idea. Thus investment funds
only flowed, into those activities characterized by hijh excess returns
per unit of risk after a substantial time lag and to a degree insuffi-
cient to equalize returns over the time period which we consider.
Investors were risk averse and while the extent of risk aversion de-
clined over time in line with increasing information experience and
opportunites for diversification, investment in many manufacturing
activities must have appeared unduly risky for the returns offered,
particularly if diversification could not be practiced. Within this
framework, the behavior of southern investors differs from that of
investors elsewhere. Southern risk aversion increased markedly curing
the decade of the 1850s and southern market failure appears more com-
plete than that in rny other region. Investment funds in the South just
did not flow towaras those activities v-d-th e:<cess returns per unit of
risk any more than wou] d be expected from an entirely random distribution
to the industries.
-26-
FOOTNOTES
*This research was financed in part by the National Science
Foundation, Grant Nos. SOC75-18917 and SOC75-20034.
Jorgensen (1971) surveys tha various profit variables used.
2
These estimates differ somewhat from those given elsewhere
(such at Bateman and Weiss, 197b) in so far as the number of sample
states has been increased and rainor changes have also been made in
some of the parameter values underlying the profit estimates.
3
"Riskless" is something of a mdsnomer , The constant term
here represents not the rate of return which could be earned with
certainty, but rather the rate of return which could be earned after
abstracting from the random risk element in manufacturing. It does
not take account of the systematic rit'k common to all manufacturing
enterprise.
4
These results are similar to those given in Bateman and
Weiss (1976 and 1977). However, they are based on larger sample
sizes and are statistically much stronger.
In order to have a consistently determined series x^ie "nave
used the average interest rate over the consis year paid on prime (i.e.,
at least two name) commercial paper as gi'en by Hacaulay (1938). For
1850 this rate was 8.7 percent, for 1860, 6.7 percent and for 1870,
8.8 percent. This rate is c] early a feasible one at which the manufac-
turer could borrow or lend.
At the five percent level of significance. At the ten per-
cent level, tae null hypothesis i^'ould be rejected in six cases.
We canno^ kno.; the anc'er to either of these ques;:ions, but with
a few assumptions we can use evidence en wholenale prices to surmise the
relationship betv/een the benchmark ectimates and the longer term situ-
ation. Consider first thr.t the calculated benchmark returns reflect
the fact that output prices w^re above average costs. This situation
should induce investment so long as investors expect that the output
price will remain above average cost. The two major cost items were
wages and raw materials, but it teems likely that itivestors would form
expectations about the price-cost r^ilationship on the basis of prices
and wage protion of costs. If we use wholesale prices as an index of
the prices manufacturers received (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975),
and assume that changes in wage^. lv^:gged behind changes in wholesale
prices (i.e., real wages vary inveTSoly to the price index), we can
use wholesale prices to indicate tre annual flow of information that
conditioned the response of investors to the benchmark excess returns.
Specifically, if wholesale prices rose in subsequent years, our bench-
mark estimate would understate investors' e>: pec tat ions; if prices fell
-27-
the benchmark data would exceed expectations; v;hile stability of prices
would mean that the benchraark data and long run expectations v/ere com-
parable. Unfortunately, the Civil V'ar clouded the pattern noticeably,
by causing rapid price increases and interfering with tne smooth flow
of investment. Nonetheless, during the 18503, vrholesale prices rose
steadily through 1857 from an index of 32 in 1849 to 111, and then
declined to 95 in 1859. For this period, investors favorable expec-
tations about excess profits should have been continually reinforced
for the bulk of the decade. During the l&60s, prices rose rapidly
through 1864, then 'declined from an index value of 193- to 151. The
effect on expectations is hard to surmise since the initial rise was
war induced, and during the post-war years investors may have attempted
to make investments they had been unable to during the war, and in
spite of the prospect of declinxng prices. In the 1870s, the whole-
sale index declined through 1878 and then rose, so here 1870 benchmark
data may overpredict the investment response that could have been
expected
.
o '
Thie function estimated vjas of the form;
logV^ = logA + C°T + ylogL + g^logL^]
where logV. = logV. + ev . and x^ar: solved using Box-Cox. non-linear
maximum likelihood method, Tl'is functicn has variable scale elasti-
city which depends upon the level of value-added, V and is defined
by e = u/(l + ev) . See "^ellner and Revankar (1969). T is the time vari-
able used as a proxy for technological progress.
9
The excess returns per unit of risl: for all manufacturing and
the ratio of capital investment at ' t + i) to capital investment at
time t were;
Excess Returns Change in Investment
1850 1860 18 70 18 50-60 1860-70 1870-80
United States .330 .404 .361 1,895 2.097 1.317
Korth .315 .-,09 .^94 1-726 2.015 1.289
South .321 .444 .322 1.734 1.086 1.504
West .367 .371 .370 7.. 734 3.192 1.377
while the excess returns per unit of risk in agriculture and the ratio
of capital investment at time (t + 1) tc capital investment at time
.
t were: ' - .
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Excess Returns Change in Investment
1350 1860 1870 1850-60 1860-70 1870-80
United States .681 .958 .667 2.013 1.393 1.105
Morth .696 1.054 .679 1.470 1.469 0.881
South .165 .418 .152 2.257 0.689 1.222
West .696 .94 9 .684 2.353 2.032 1.199
Investment in agriculture was measured by the value of farm and the
value of farm implements. Profit and variability estimates in agricul-
ture are all for 1860 and were taken from Bateman and Atack (1969),
Table 14.
See particularly, Davis (1963, 1965 and 1971).
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